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ESCAPE TACTICS OF GERMAN WAR PRISONERS
Wliam E. Kirwan
(With a nation at war the problem of counteracting escape of prisoners
of war is not only a difficult one but is one of vital concern to the nation
at large. In the following article, Mr. Kirwan describes a series of revealing
facts about how German war prisoners have devised and engineered methods
of escape. Now a few words concerning the author. He is a graduate of
Fordham University and was employed as a research chemist previous to his
appointment to the New York State Police in 1936. A year later he was
assigned to the department's Scientific Laboratory and served as an assistant
to the late Dr. Kirschberg until his death in 1941. Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Kirwan was appointed director of the laboratory. The article is based in
part on one which appeared in the August, 1944, issue of the New York
State Police Bufletin.-Editor.)

In the course of scientific criminal investigation, it is sometimes the good fortune of the New York State Police Bureau of
Criminal Investigation to investigate a case which proves to be
of great interest, not only from the scientific viewpoint but to
the nation at large. Such was the instance in which our Scientific
Laboratory obtained very interesting information relative to
escape tactics of German prisoners of war. Our participation in
the subject followed as a result of the finding of several counterfeit selective service cards by an intelligence officer of the armed
forces. Later investigation disclosed the counterfeiting of selective service cards as one of a variety of techniques employed in
devising systematic methods of escape. In this article I shall
picture, briefly, the prison camp which I was granted permission
to visit in order to secure information, the "observatory" system
devised by which prisoners are supplied with salient information
required for effective escape, methods of planning and supervising
escape, and finally, German methods of counterfeiting and authentication of documents.
I cannot disclose the location of the German internment camp
visited. But I may describe certain interesting phases of it. Sgme
700 German prisoners-officers and enlisted men-were con ned
there. About 60 per cent of the officers were of the true V~azi
strain. They ranged from 30 to 35 years of age and were mostly
of high rank. The adjutant or highest ranking officer was a colonel
of the Luftwaffe. Area of the prison camp embraced approximately 354 acres of which seven acres was enclosed in barbed
wire. This area is known as the "enclosure" or "cage" and within
it are located the four story, thick-walled, stone building-which
serves as a dormitory for the great portion of the prisonersand several smaller buildings constructed of wood.
For reasons of greater security against escape, the immediate
area in which the buildings are located is blocked off by three
rings of barbed wire fence. The outer ring is about 12 feet high.
Located about 15 feet from the outer ring is a second fence of
the same height as the outer ring. Bottoms of both fences are
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protected by further barbed wire entanglements which aid in discouraging attempts to crawl under the fences. Then on the inside of the second fence at a distance of about 10 feet there is
a third barbed wire fence some three feet high. This is called the
"verbotten" fence. No prisoner is permitted to climb over it and
if he should try, he would be reprimanded by a well-directed
shot from one of the six towers which protect the outer fences.
But these precautions do not imply that prisoners are prohibited from going outside the enclosure. As a matter of fact,
under the honor system in force in the camp German officers are
permitted significant freedom of movement outside the stockade
but within the 354 acres of camp. They are free to tend their
farms in the camp area and are also permitted to walk along
certain paths. They must, however, return by noon for the midday count and by 5:00 p.m. for the evening meal. And this honor
must be countersigned by the adjutant of the prisoners. That
they respect the honor privilege is shown by the fact that not
one attempted escape or actual escape has been made while they
were on honor. However, as soon as the officer returns to the
stockade his honor pledge ceases. Any violation of the honor
revokes the privileges of all others and violators are severely reprimanded and punished by their own adjutant. If and when
they return to Germany they will be properly punished.
The Observatory System
One of the amazing features of German escape technique is
the efficiency of their "observatory" or secret service system established to find out and catalogue all information of possible
assistance in aiding escape. The prisoners have their own information bureau which maintains a 24 hour observation of the
activities of sentries, guards, and any action going on within
their range of vision. Note the following report of a prisoner
on his observation:
2120 hours--Sentry from 4 to 5
2124 hours--Stops at the shed
2225 hours--Express train back (A)
2230 hours-Into inner yard
2235 hours-Sentry goes to guardhouse from No. 5 tower
2237 hours--O. K. in the tower
2240 hours--Stops in the front part of the yard
2247 hours-Sentry goes from guardhouse to No. 5 tower
2255 hours--Sentry goes from guardhouse to No. 4 tower
(A running sentry?)
2259 hours-Two sentries go from guardhouse to No. 4 tower
2304 hours-Two sentries go from No. 4 tower to guardhouse
2308 hours-A running sentry (?)
2312 hours--Inner round
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As may be anticipated, rather complete data is available regarding train movements in the prison locality. The prisoners know
the train schedules. They can tell when and what train is scheduled
to arrive, how long it stops at the station, whether it be a fast
or slow freight, passenger train or otherwise.
But escape information is by no means limited to the immediate area surrounding the prison camp. Since their general
plan of escape is to reach the Atlantic coast, steal a boat and
sail around in the sea lanes in the hope that a German submarine
will pick them up and return them to Germany to strike another
blow for Der Fuehrer, they seek all available information concerning our coast patrols and regulations. Their success in acquiring information is shown in some of the papers seized in searches:
"First Naval District, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve formed
June 6th, 1939, vessels became Coast Guard auxiliaries 19th
February, 1941. 67 flotillas in 6 divisions in first naval district
from the northern boundary of Maine to the boundary of the
first and third district of the Connecticut shores."
"Coast Guard activity 3rd Naval District (from New London,
Connecticut, as far as Gray House, New York) 3,000 vessels,
6,000 men. Patrol activity has expanded to a point where this
past summer (1942) the entire coastal waters as well as harbors
from Portland, Me., to Westerly, Rhode Island, were covered.
"In service:
273 vessels-12,000 auxiliary members
8 flotillas-215 men-fishing and reporting
2 flotillas-83 men standing by
1 flotilla-60 men maintaining constant beach patrol
Post security fleet-first naval district-300 vessels."
Whether or not this information is correct only the War Department can answer. Nevertheless, the prisoners did manage to learn
these facts.
Planning and Supervising Escapes
Typical of all prisoners, the majority of their time is spent
in thinking about means of escape. It is an honor for any war
prisoner to legitimately escape. The Gei nan prisoners of war
have very definite ideas on escape. In each camp there is an
organized and powerful escape committee. It must approve all
plans for escape. Preparations made by the prisoners are carefully studied in advance of escape. The committee determines if
he has proper supplies, information, money and other details.
Such escape committees also review all unsuccessful escape attempts. I shall call to your attention a documrent tkep from a
prisoner in which an unsuccessful attempt was criticized. For
obvious reasons we shall call the prisoner in question Smith:
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"Statement Re the Case of K. K. Smith"
"1. Concerning this case such as it is, there is nothing
basically to be changed. Everybody knows my opinion
about it.
2. The self-established point beifig helpful was not
reached by K. K. Smith.
3. In order to reach his established goal he made an
attempt to escape on the 31st of April, and on the 26th
of June he escaped. My opinion concerning this is:
(a) The attempt to escape:
The project was tackled only determinedly and coldbloodedly and was likewise executed, he has shown herewith his initiative. I make this statement from my own
observation as well as according to information received
from Captain X who was an eye witness at the beginning
of the enterprise. I also had the information concerning
this. The fact that the man was caught on the third fence
is due to the nature of such an enterprise. This does not
excuse K. K. Smith and does not mean that this case
cannot be criticized but that there should not be any
reproaches made.
(b) The escape:
Suddenly the chance appeared and K. K. Smith did not
wait any longer. Further, he chanced it, having made a
quick decision although he had not made any preparations, i. e., fitting out provisions, food, etc. All those of
you knew it, believed not in the escape. I obtained the
story of the escape of K. K. Smith. You will understand
that in this delicate case I cannot enter upon any particulars but only give you the facts.
My criticism:
(a) The weather.
The enterprise suffered from the beginning under unsurmounting difficulties. The weather was very bad as
you remember. It was raining heavily, it was a real
thunderstorm. (Remember how we were anxious about
our luggage, because we feared that part of our luggage
was piled up in the open.)
Owing to the fact that we could not re-dress, the
clothing of K. K. Smith never became dry during the
undertaking.
(b) The orientation:
It was difficult and took plenty of time. As he had only
rough plans about his goal, wrong ideas existed. There
was no map on hand, means of transportation dared
not be used (except a night freight train).
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(c) The ground:
The country is very low. In parts it is marshy. The
country is crisscrossed by small ditches, fences, and
hedges and small parts of very thick underbrush. As
he could not move along streets or roads his progress
was very strenuous and robbed him of a lot of time.
(d) Maintenance:
The kind of escape did not allow him to take any
necessary things with him. As the enterprise was determined as an actual fact in a very short time, he denied himself the use of maintenance. Only a Red Cross
tin of chocolate served as iron rations. During the 68
hours this was the only nourishment along with some
grass and herbs. Likewise during that time he could not
think of a long sleep.
In spite of these difficulties I have pointed out the
goal was found and approached from several angles.
Necessary measures and safety precautions having been
found, the break-in was not successful owing to the fact
that all means of aid were so damaged by the dampness
that they had to be replaced. While taking a rest during
the day which also served for reconnoitering the approach to the goal anew for the following night, arrest
resulted by a street patrol. Escape was no longer possible.
My decision:
The enterprise was executed with zeal and deliberation and although he did not succeed in the last attempt
of reaching his self-appointed goal, we cannot reproach
Smith. There was no lack of enterprise and initiative.
My conclusion:
K. K. Smith came to me on the 30th day of July. He
asked me to help him start a new attempt as soon as
possible. He said his previous experience would be a
great help to him. I agreed with it but made the following reservations:
For the rest of the summer, that means about the end
of October, there is no possibility to seek any preference
from the camp committee as it had already engaged on
another project with my cooperation. (I cannot give
any information about this.) Except for this reservation I am ready to help him to the fullest measure anew
as well as forwarding a request to the committee. I also
will do anything necessary in order to prepare his enterprise. This readiness to help I am submitting to the suitable officers as before.
Once again I want to remind everybody of the order

WILLIAM

E. KIRWAN

in which it says that K. K. Smith should not be subject
to recriminations. I grant nobody the right to contradict
this order now much less than before. I am the only
one responsible for the conception of honor of the marine
officers corps and especially for the kind which we enjoy
in this case. Likewise, this whole case is no matter for
conversation.
(Signed)

,

Frigattenkapitaen

We, the undersigned, took notice 2 August, 1943.
(Signed)
(Three officers).
Communicated to the marine officers corps 2 August, 1943.
(Signed)

, Frigattenkapitaen

NOTIFICATION
To the Senior Officer Marine Corps:
I have taken notice of the above mentioned publication. The true statements contained therein concerning
my escape correspond with the actual facts.
(Signed) Smith, K. K."
Use of the Mails in Receiving and Sending
"Verboten" Information
German prisoners of war are allowed to receive mail and
packages from Germany (and elsewhere) and, of course, to send
mail. This is postage free. As to packages, perhaps the German
postal authorities examine the contents before accepting the
packages. But if this is done there is no indication of it on the
wrappings. The packages are placed in a burlap bag and are
sent here to the internment camp where each package is opened
and the contents are closely examined for hidden messages,
weapons, liquor and other questioned or forbidden articles.
Attempts to smuggle information into the camps are unusually clever. In one instance messages were concealed on the
inside of prune stones. Someone had removed the nut from the

stone and had inserted a message. The prunes were then sealed
in a tin can. Other messages have been found on cigarette papers,
in fountain pens, hidden in linings of clothing, in bread, and in
the covers of books. Consequently, very close examination is made
of every package.
As for letters, these are censored in Germany, then censored
on this continent and again censored by the prison authorities.
After packages and mail are all examined, the prisoners distribute
the mail through their own post office system. All packages sent
through the International Red Cross are receipted by the prisoners and this receipt is returned to Germany as proof of delivery.
Occasionally a prisoner attempts to send out a cryptic message
or secret writing. In this instance the letters are confiscated and
are held until the termination of activities at which time it is to be
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returned to the prisoner. The prisoners must use a special safety
paper for their correspondence. This paper will reveal aiy attempt
at secret writings, as it is specially prepared to turn green in color
whenever any moisture contacts the paper. The prisoners, however, were quick to catch on. They discovered that by making indented writings, accomplished by writing over a piece of waxed
paper over the safety paper, they could conceal a message. Now
the authorities are developing a newer safety paper which will
eliminate this possibility.
Preparationof Counterfeit Documents
for Escape Use
That the. prisoners prepare themselves for escape is a foregone conclusion. During any surprise search of the prisoners'
quarters, there is always found many interesting counterfeit documents which have been prepared for escape purposes. The Nazis
appear to have an inherent weakness for rubber stamps. They
feel that if a document is rubber stamped it becomes authentic.
Because of this philosophy of validity, they will resort to means
without end to making rubber stamps for authentication purposes.
There follow two illustrations of documents bearing the imprint
of counterfeit seals made by German prisoners:
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You may wonder how they manage to get rubber stamps.
It is very simple. They make them out of raw potatoes. Some of
the carvings are works of art to behold. As for letterheads, these
are made from linoleum cuts. It is well to know that all of these
counterfeit documents are authentic as to letterheads and signatures. Such companies, places and persons actually exist and hold
the offices designated. One of the prisoners forged a military pass
and signed the name of a very high ranking officer as authority.
This pass gave him full authority to ride any train, examine any
officer's credentials- all supposedly on a secret and confidential
mission! I should point out, too, that German prisoners are very
adept at making maps. One map we found was a fine detailed map
of the State of Vermont. The map itself was pregnated with linseed oil in order to make it waterproof.
Due to the importance of having in one's possession an appropriate selective service card, German ingenuity has reached a peak
in the preparation of counterfeit selective service cards. As I
mentioned at the beginning of this article, our investigation of
German techniques of escape began in consequence of the finding
of a number of counterfeit selective service cards by a member
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of our armed forces. Now, I should like to turn specific attention
to this particular technique of German war prisoners in carrying
out their escape. This is one of the counterfeit documents found:
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In the process of investigating the fraud, we learned that the
counterfeit selective service cards had been printed in a German
internment camp.
The counterfeit selective service card is very cleverly made.
Close examination does not reveal any obvious difference with
the genuine, except for one notable exception. If you examine
your own selective service card, you will probably observe that
when the card is turned over as you would the page of a book, the
printing on the reverse side is right side up. On the counterfeit
card, when it was turned in like manner, the printing on the
reverse side was upside down. However, after we had examined
some hundred genuine selective service cards, we found one genuine card to be identical in printing characteristics to the counterfeits. Consequently, we cannot, at this time, establish the "upside
down" criterion as a means of detecting a counterfeit selective
service card. All of which is simply another indication that we
must use every possible endeavor if we are to combat and overcome the trickerous ingenuity of German war prisoners in their
all-out efforts to avoid apprehension while on escape.
You may wonder how it was possible for such perfect coun-
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terfeiting to be made in an internment camp where facilities for
reproduction are obviously meager. This is the system the prisoners employed: For a model, the prisoners used a photographic
reproduction of the selective service card which was printed in
a German magazine. The magazine was passed quite innocently
by our censors. For the printing process, the prisoners had engraved a plate by using a piece of linoleum and india ink. The
latter was furnished the prisoners for drawing purposes. The
cardboard used was apparently salvaged from some place on the
grounds of the camp. Thus the prisoners were able to prepare for
escape an invaluable ally.
As to powers of arrest, authorities of both the state and
federal governments have the right to arrest, hold and prosecute
prisoners within their jurisdiction during the period of escape
from an internment camp and while outside the limits of the
camp. However, it is the policy of the War Department to prosecute all such offenders by court martial. State and federal authorities, who have arrested escaped prisoners of war for crimes
allegedly committed during escape have cooperated with the War
Department and have returned the recaptured prisoners of war
to military custody for proper action.
It should be noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the search of
escaped prisoners of war. It is, therefore, most important that
when an escaped prisoner of war is apprehended, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation be notified so that nation-wide hunt can
be cancelled since the Bureau notifies all key police departments,
sheriffs' offices, radio stations and newspapers of the escape.
It is, therefore, imperative that these messages be cancelled as
soon as possible after the apprehension of the escaped prisoners.
I recall to mind, in closing, one other striking feature of
escape tactics. It has to do with methods of concealing currency
while escaping. Nominally, prisoners are not permitted to possess
currency. Money sent to them is simply credited to their account.
Be that as it may, however, the capture of fleeing prisoners has
disclosed some very clever methods of concealing currency for
they resort to any means to hide any currency which they manage
to get. They cut spaces in the leather heels of their boots or hide
it in their clothing. One enterprising prisoner cut a small slit in
the hide of his pet dog, hid some money therein and then sewed
the skin. The four-legged traveling bank was only discovered
when the dog rubbed his back against the leg of one of the guards.
He felt a hard lump, investigated and found the money. Such
in brief, is the account of some of the escape tactics of our
German prisoners of war.

